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Roula Khalaf, editor -in -chief of the FT, selects her favorite stories in this weekly newsletter.
Are the United States still an ally? Did he even become an opponent? The fact that Europeans ask themselves these questions show how Donald Trump and his new administration have radically rewritten the terms of the transatlantic security relationship. Trump refused to exclude the use of force to take control of Greenland, the sovereign territory of NATO Allemark. In his haste to reach an agreement with Russia to end his war against Ukraine, Trump’s team concluded Early concessions in Moscow while cutting Kyiv and the European capitals outside the talks. US officials claim to want a fair and lasting peace in Ukraine but, at the same time, attack the country wealth as a rear payment for previous American military aid.
It was still clear, the United States would force Europeans to assume the burden of their own security more. The question was whether the quarter would be agreed and ordered or if it would be chaotic and dangerous. Europe has missed the time to prepare for the first and is now faced with the second.
After the large -scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia three years ago, Europeans failed to rearm with the speed and the scale that the uninsured aggression of Russia required, despite efforts from Poland and other leading states and certain EU defense innovations. Trump’s return to power and the antagonism of his administration broke the complacency of Europe.
An emergency meeting for European leaders in Paris on Monday was a first chance to show a renewed resolution and ambition to rebuild the continent’s defenses and guarantee that any Ukrainian peace agreement is fair and lasting. But it was discourage. British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer boldly declared that he was ready to send troops to Ukraine to guarantee peace after the US if the United States provided a safeguard. Other leaders have found the question too difficult. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said he was “irritated” that the problem had raised.
Europe should always act in its long -term interests, even if it had trouble defending itself today without American support. Its future security will be decided in Ukraine, therefore its first duty is to strengthen military aid to kyiv by funding the production of Ukrainian weapons, by pouring resources into drone and drats technology, by subsidizing an extended production capacity And by signing long-term contracts to replace the United States. Kit provided such as aerial defenses and long -range strikes. He could use his sanctions regime to access and influence negotiations.
The European powers must develop military plans to dissuade Russia from again attacking Ukraine after a cease-fire, ranging from a better formation of Ukrainian troops to the application of an air exclusion zone for Potentially send troops as a “comfort force”. Putting on sufficient ground boots would be a huge business. This can be impossible without American support. But Europeans cannot dissuade Russia by standing out.
Finally, Europeans must invest. The strengthening of defenses mainly requires a sustained increase in national defense expenditure, countries revising their tax executives and their expenditure priorities to make room. There is a solid argument for joint loans, at the EU level, is as a coalition of the will, including the United Kingdom, to finance an increase in short-term expenses and finance joint purchases. A multilateral defense bank could also help governments and defense manufacturers. Europe will also have to build autonomous planning and command structures, ideally within NATO but potentially outside it.
It is not impossible that these stages can persuade Trump to stick to a rebalancing alliance and maintain a final American security guarantee for Europe. What is certain is that without such an overhaul, Europe will be dangerously exposed.
