Unlock the White House Watch watch newsletter for free
Your guide on what the US elections of 2024 mean for Washington and Le Monde
The writer was a national security advisor to vice-president Kamala Harris. Daleep Singh, Deputy National Security Advisor for the International Economy in Biden administration, also contributed
Europe’s response to the shocking withdrawal from the Trump administration to Ukraine has been admirable and can be historic. Instead of accepting Donald Trump’s embrace of Russia’s false story on war, remaining silent or quarrel with each other, European leaders have doubled kyiv’s support, committing to stimulating security assistance and gathering a “coalition of the will”.
These steps are welcome, but not sufficient. Increased European defense expenditure will not be quick enough to replace the equipment Washington was transferred to Ukraine. And without an American security net, which Trump refuses to provide, even European forces in Ukraine would not be an adequate means of deterrence against the future Russian aggression.
Instead, the only really effective option to save Ukraine is to grasp the more than $ 200 billion in Russian assets currently frozen in Europe and devote this money to support the industrial, military and defense of Ukraine base. This money would help Ukraine to acquire the means to defend itself and provide a rescue buoy for its economy. And this would give Europe the effect of negotiation lever he needs to negotiate a fair and lasting end war.
French officials are reported Consider a plan to grasp Russian assets if Moscow violates a future ceasefire agreement. But this idea neglects the reality that all ceases that is worth the document on which it is written will require that Ukraine develops a force capable of dissuading future Russian aggression and a path to rebuild an economy devastated by three years of Russian attacks. None of these things will be possible without using some of the frozen assets, especially since Washington reduces financial support to Ukraine.
In the Biden administration, we have worked for years to persuade Europe to join us to transfer these assets to Ukraine, but we did not succeed. While the Europeans accompanied an agreement of the G7 in the fall to provide a loan to Ukraine guaranteed by interest on frozen assets, they continued to find reasons not to seize the director. But their arguments were not convincing at that time and are much less convincing now. While European leaders reconsider their options, they should keep several points in mind.
First, although the legal basis of confiscation is disputed, many legal researchers have concluded that this is healthy as long as it is done in the context of countermeasures against the illegal aggression of Russia. The principle established for a long time of “trigger” would allow Ukraine to file its request for repair damages against the claim of Russia to recover its frozen assets.
Second, the seizure of Russian assets in Europe will not, contrary to European concerns, dissuade countries from having more euros than freezing these assets indefinitely, which the countries of Europe and the G7 already do. The American, European, British and Japanese action to immobilize Russia’s assets in 2022 has practically dissuaded only anyone who has dollars, euros, the pound sterling or yen since then, even if almost no one thinks that Russia will never recover these assets.
Third, it is not because most of the assets frozen in Europe do not mean that the euro would be more at risk than the dollar. It was not a secret for anyone that the American authorities paved the way by persuading the G7 to freeze the assets of Russia in the aftermath of Putin’s invasion. Last spring, the congress voted massively to give the president the power to grasp these assets for the benefit of Ukraine. Today, no potential aggressive nations would conclude that their assets are no longer safe in the United States in Europe.
Fourth, the risk of opening a Pandora’s box for repairs to the Second World War is exaggerated. While some in Poland would use crises to strengthen their long -standing claims, there is no appetite elsewhere for the reopening of this problem solved.
And finally, while Russia has threatened to retaliate against foreign societies that take place there if Europe transfers its frozen assets to Ukraine, the additional risk is minimal. Any Western enterprise which still has physical or intangible assets in Russia has either struck off these complaints or already understands that it will need to do so.
None of this should reject European concerns concerning the seizure of Russia as trivial assets. But with American support to Ukraine now in doubt, the greatest danger is a continuous inaction. Decisive European stages to grasp the assets of Russia would shake the balance of powers in the conflict as much as Trump’s pivot to Russia last week – but this time in the name of justice and freedom rather than the shameful betrayal of a democratic ally fighting for its existence.
